What Do Crowd Equity Investors Do? Exploring Post-Investment Activities in Equity Crowdfunding by Garaus, Christian et al.
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT 1
What Do Crowd Equity Investors Do? Exploring
Postinvestment Activities in Equity Crowd Funding
Christian Garaus , Nadine Izdebski, and Christopher Lettl
Abstract—Equity crowdfunding has become a viable alternative
to the traditional forms of financing technology startups. This
survey-based two-study article aims to shed light on the prevalence
of crowd equity investors’ postinvestment activities and the an-
tecedents to these engagement activities. Our first study finds that
most crowd equity investors engage with the startups in which they
invest in some way. While the majority engage in low-involvement
activities (e.g., word of mouth), a smaller number of crowd equity
investors also engage in high-involvement activities (e.g., strategic
advice). Our second study reveals that engagement in these ac-
tivities is driven by investment-, investor-, and proximity-related
factors. In particular, the amount of investment—despite its small-
ness compared with that in the traditional forms of funding—is
a reliable antecedent of crowd equity investors’ engagement in
postinvestment activities. Furthermore, age and geographic prox-
imity are positively associated with low-involvement activities,
whereas intrinsic motivation and personal proximity are positively
linked to high-involvement activities. By providing insights into
the prevalence of postinvestment activities in equity crowdfunding
and their antecedents, this article contributes to the debate on the
potential of equity crowdfunding to complement or even replace
the traditional forms of funding technological innovation.
Index Terms—Crowdsourcing, entrepreneurship, technological
innovation, venture capital.
I. INTRODUCTION
V ENTURE capital plays an important role in technologyentrepreneurship [1]. Technology startups often require
significant outside investments to meet the numerous finan-
cial needs, such as financing product development, purchasing
equipment, and hiring technical and sales personnel before they
begin to generate enough revenue to self-sustain [2], [3].
While venture capitalists and business angels have been the
dominant way for technology startups to obtain the required
equity capital in the past, a new form of funding entrepreneurial
ventures has emerged in the past decade—crowdfunding [4].
The idea of pooling relatively small amounts of money from a
high number of individuals is not new per se, but because of
the emergence of the Internet, the level of professionalization
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of crowdfunding has reached an unprecedented level. In 2018,
around USD 10.2 billion was raised globally via the crowd,
and this number is expected to increase to USD 28.8 billion in
2025 [5]. As the number of individuals who financially support
all kinds of projects increased, so did the specialization of this
form of financing. Crowdfunding is classified into four different
subforms that offer different rewards in return for financial
support [6]. In reward-based crowdfunding, the initiators of cre-
ative projects, such as music, games, or technological products,
reward their supporters with either the corresponding product or
a project-related good. In lending-based crowdfunding, individ-
uals turn to the crowd to receive a loan and, in return, pay interest
to their creditors. If the supporters of mostly social projects do
not receive any tangible reward, the process is called donation-
based crowdfunding. This article focuses on the fourth form,
equity-based crowdfunding—in which investors receive profit
shares or profit participation rights in return for their financial
investment [7]—as this form has an increasing impact on the
financing of technological entrepreneurship and innovation [8].
With the rise of equity crowdfunding platforms that democ-
ratize access to capital for entrepreneurial ventures, the tradi-
tional assumptions in the venture finance literature, such as
those about postinvestment activities [9], are challenged. The
traditional providers of risk capital financially invest in startups
not only to obtain shares of future revenue but also to support
startups in ways that go beyond funding [10], [11]. They provide
nonmonetary resources, such as strategic advice, feedback, and
access to networks [12]. These resources help them perform
better, on average, than the nonrisk financier-backed ventures
[13], show higher growth rates [14], and develop and market
products faster [15]. The underlying assumption is that often,
the knowledge provided by venture financiers is secret, tacit, and
shared only with carefully chosen, legally bound startups [16].
While the democratizing function of equity crowdfunding—
in which large crowds rather than the small groups of risk
investors, such as venture capitalists or business angels, provide
funding [4]—is a benefit for entrepreneurs as given the greater
freedom they gain, the question whether crowds can provide
postinvestment activities has been unclear until lately [9], [17].
Equity crowdfunding platforms, entrepreneurship blogs, and
magazines often claim that crowd equity investors, similar to
business angels and venture capitalists, not only provide money
but also engage beyond funding, but systematic research on
this topic has been missing. Recently, research pioneered by Di
Pietro et al. [16] found the first qualitative evidence that crowd
equity investors also engage in postinvestment activities [16].
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These researchers have identified different types of input from
the crowd, such as product cocreation, provision of strategic
and market knowledge, provision of access to networks, and
activities to increase public awareness. The authors also discuss
that such activities may have both positive and negative effects
on the respective startups.
What we do not know, however, is the prevalence of these
postinvestment activities among crowd equity investors and the
antecedents of such activities. Insights into the prevalence of
postinvestment activities are crucial, as activities that require
personal contact with the founders may not only carry significant
benefits but also induce costs for the startup and may even unfold
detrimental effects (e.g., conflicts if the founders do not follow
crowd equity investors’ advice, cognitive overload, and distrac-
tion). Insights into the antecedents are important, as they inform
how startups can potentially influence crowd equity investors’
postinvestment activities. The goal of this article, therefore, is
to investigate crowd equity investors’ engagement in postinvest-
ment behavior by addressing the following research questions:
First, what is the prevalence of crowd equity investors’ postin-
vestment activities? Second, what are the antecedents of these
postinvestment activities?
This article is explorative in nature, and it intends to initiate
a discussion about a rather nascent phenomenon. Therefore, we
not only draw on research from the traditional risk investors to
identify the potential postinvestment activities of crowd equity
investors but also expand our analysis to somewhat distant
literature streams that share structural similarities with equity
crowdfunding. In particular, we examine research on user en-
trepreneurs leveraging user communities as an asset as a distinct
yet somewhat related phenomenon. As von Krogh et al. [18]
suggest when researching new phenomena, we do not develop
hypotheses but instead use the variables in our model as filters
to create an understanding of relevant aspects.
This article uses a two-survey design. In Study 1, we explore
the prevalence of postinvestment activities among 151 crowd
equity investors. The idea for Study 2, in which we examine
the investment-, investor-, and proximity-related antecedents of
postinvestment activities (n = 254), emerged in the research
process after analyzing Study 1 and had three reasons. First,
before proceeding to the next step (i.e., investigating the an-
tecedents), we wanted to replicate the research question 1 using
an independent sample and a similar research design to increase
the reliability and generalizability of our findings. Second, we
intended to integrate learnings from Study 1 in the design of
Study 2. For instance, we decided to survey the crowd equity
investors of only one focal startup to eliminate potentially con-
founding factors on the level of the startup. Third, we sought
to draw on a rather large sample size for our analysis to avoid
underpowered results.
The results of Study 1 indicate that the vast majority of crowd
equity investors engage beyond funding. The most common
types of postinvestment activities that investors engage in are
those that require rather low involvement, such as promoting the
product or startup, using the product or service, and providing
feedback. However, a smaller number of crowd equity investors
also engage in high-involvement activities that are performed
by the traditional venture financiers, such as giving advice or
providing feedback related to the new product development
process.
In Study 2, we find a positive association between the size
of the investment and engagement in postinvestment activi-
ties. Geographic proximity and age are linked to low- but not
high-involvement activities. Personal proximity and intrinsic
motivation are linked to high-involvement activities only.
We enrich the literature on this topic by elucidating the
postinvestment activities in equity crowdfunding in terms of
their prevalence and antecedents and, thus, contributing to the
debate on whether this new form of entrepreneurial finance can
complement or even replace the traditional provision of risk
capital [9].
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section II
addresses the first research question, which concerns the preva-
lence of postinvestment activities performed by crowd equity
investors. We provide theoretical considerations before present-
ing the corresponding study (Study 1). Section III addresses the
second research question, which relates to the antecedents of
postinvestment activities. Again, we provide theoretical consid-
erations before presenting the corresponding study (Study 2).
In Section IV, we discuss the findings and their theoretical and
managerial implications, and concludes this article.
II. PREVALENCE OF POSTINVESTMENT ACTIVITIES BY CROWD
EQUITY INVESTORS
A. Study 1: Theoretical Considerations
In recent years, the number of studies on crowdfunding has
continuously increased with many focusing on lending- and
reward-based crowdfunding, as these forms are the most popular
globally in terms of market share and media coverage. Specif-
ically, researchers have analyzed the potential success factors
of crowdfunding [19]–[21], the motives of crowd funders [22],
[23], their herding behavior [24], and geographical factors [25].
Fewer articles, especially those that involve empirical analy-
ses, focus on equity-based crowdfunding and the benefits it may
have over the traditional forms of venture finance. Hornuf and
Schwienbacher [7] illustrate the differences between the crowd
equity investors and business angels and theorize about the
potential characteristics that influence crowd participation. The
benefits of equity crowdfunding based on its novel ownership
structure—a large number of individuals who are often potential
customers or users—have been studied by Belleflamme et al.
[20]; they argue that an equity crowdfunding campaign can
be used as a marketing tool. Moreover, Agrawal et al. [25]
find that this form of venture finance has a comparably lower
cost of capital and generates better information regarding the
market potential of a product or service than the other forms
of entrepreneurial financing. These studies highlight the differ-
ences between the crowd equity investors and the traditional
risk investors and give some indications of their potential en-
gagement beyond funding, but systematic research about crowd
equity investors’ postinvestment activities has been scarce. Only
Di Pietro et al. [16] have started working in that direction by
qualitatively investigating how startups use the underutilized
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assets of their crowd of investors as sources of input beyond
funding (as we will elaborate later in this section) and comparing
these with the postinvestment activities of the traditional risk
investors.
The postinvestment activities of the traditional risk investors
are usually linked to their interest in increasing the value of the
venture, so they often provide the startup team with additional
resources and know-how [10], [12], [26]. Denis [27] illustrates
that the venture capitalists serve a monitoring function, help
the company to professionalize on several levels, and act as a
certification for the company, which helps attract further financ-
ing. Furthermore, business angels support young ventures by
providing strategic advice, networks, and assistance in obtaining
finance from other sources [28], [29]. Politis [11] identifies four
postinvestment activities of business angels: strategic consult-
ing; supervision and monitoring; facilitation of the acquisition of
key resources (e.g., capital, business contacts, and professional
managers); and support on an interpersonal level.
Although crowd equity investors can be regarded as risk
investors, they differ from business angels and venture capi-
talists in several ways, which may affect their postinvestment
activities. First, the amounts they invest are substantially smaller
than those invested by business angels and venture capitalists
[28], [30], [31]. Thus, it could be assumed that the smaller
investments of crowd equity investors would lead to their lower
additional engagement because of the lower risks and smaller
expected returns of their investment [25]. Second, the number
of coinvestors is substantially higher in equity crowdfunding
than in the traditional risk investing. According to the bystander
effect, the responsibility to provide support is distributed among
all the people involved, leading everyone to rely on others
to help instead of providing help themselves [32]. Therefore,
having many coinvestors could restrict the engagement of an
individual investor in postinvestment activities. Third, in equity
crowdfunding, an intermediary platform initiates and settles the
investment deal between two parties, thus making a personal ex-
change between the investor and the entrepreneur unnecessary.
By contrast, establishing personal contact, building trust, and
evaluating the entrepreneurial team are prerequisites for invest-
ment by the formal or informal investors [33]. This increases the
investors’ perceived responsibility to support the management
team [34], which is considered a necessary precondition for
venture financiers’ knowledge sharing [4]. As crowd equity
investors often lack personal relationships with the startup, they
may be less inclined to develop feelings of obligation to engage
with the startup beyond funding.
Because of these differences, it seems puzzling that initial
insights into the qualities of crowd equity investors’ potential
input indicate that the crowd equity investors engage in a wide
scope of postinvestment activities (i.e., product cocreation, strat-
egy knowledge, market knowledge, access to their network,
public awareness). Di Pietro et al. [16] qualitative study finds
that crowd equity investors engage in activities aimed at pro-
viding business development support, guidance in long-term
firm strategic decisions (strategy knowledge), and advice about
the market in which the company operates; they also engage
in activities aimed at offering services and advice on different
business areas (market knowledge) and providing connections
with external stakeholders and relevant industry players (access
to their network), as well as in activities seeking to promote the
brand and enhance firm external visibility (public awareness).
These activities do not only cover aspects from the traditional
finance literature but also seem somewhat related to the phe-
nomenon of user entrepreneurs using communities as an external
resource. The literature has shown that startups can benefit
from user communities in multiple ways [35]. The members of
communities share ideas, information, and resources [36], [37].
By being a part of a community, an entrepreneur can obtain first-
hand information about the needs and preferences of potential
adopters of new products, such as interesting applications, com-
mon problems, desired features, and unexpected experiences.
If an existing prototype is shared with the community, users
can give feedback and act as beta testers, helping to refine the
product’s design or functionality [37]. The feedback can help
check ideas or serve as an early warning to avoid solutions
that would not be in demand [38]. Thus, communities can be
seen as a test market; the diffusion inside the community might
give a first indication of the diffusion outside the community
[35]. Community members can also provide startups with other
resources. The resources can range from specific knowledge to
a supply of the technology needed for the provision of physical
facilities [38].
However, a crowd is not a community but a group of people
who do not necessarily know one another or a loosely bound
public. In the context of equity crowdfunding, crowds form
only to fund the startup, whereas communities have a shared
interest in continuing exchange relations [37]. To reinforce and
support cooperative behavior for reaching this shared interest,
most communities even develop—in sharp contrast to crowds—
rules, norms, and techniques for maintaining their structure and
integrity over time [35]. We, therefore, presume that the trans-
ferability of insights from user communities’ role engagement
to the context of equity crowdfunding is limited.
The above overview of the literature shows that the crowd
equity investors may engage in a variety of activities that go
beyond funding. However, the prevalence of these activities
among crowd equity investors is unclear. Is engagement in
postinvestment activities the exception or the rule?
B. Study 1: Methods
1) Data Collection: To explore the prevalence of postinvest-
ment activities of crowd equity investors, we conducted an online
survey among German-speaking crowd equity investors. As
there are no available databases of the full population of crowd
equity investors in German-speaking countries (such databases
would be impossible to compile because anyone can become a
crowd equity investor), we combined different means to reach
out to them. In Study 1, we contacted startups that recently
completed an equity crowdfunding campaign on a platform used
in German-speaking countries, Seedmatch, and asked them to
forward an online survey link to their crowd equity investors.
In total, 151 of the 814 crowd equity investors (response rate:
18.55%) accomplished our survey.
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TABLE I
CROWD EQUITY INVESTORS’ ENGAGEMENT IN POSTINVESTMENT ACTIVITIES
Note: n = 151; items translated from German.
2) Measures: Postinvestment activities: To measure engage-
ment in postinvestment activities, we asked the crowd equity
investors what they did for the startup beyond providing fund-
ing. The items included user-like activities requiring a rather
low involvement, such as “I told friends and acquaintances
about the product/service.” However, they also included venture
financier-like activities, such as “I support the startup with advice
(e.g., on financial/legal matters or decisions regarding strategy
or management).” All items are listed in Table I. We also asked
an open-ended question on the additional activities that the
crowd equity investors performed that were not listed in the
closed questions. Answers to this open-ended question could be
categorized among the existing items. For instance, one crowd
equity investor mentioned, “I distributed flyers for the startup,”
which we recoded into “I worked as an employee of the startup.”
Time spent on postinvestment activities: We asked crowd eq-
uity investors the number of hours they spent on postinvestment
activities. We summed up each equity investor’s responses to
arrive at the total score of the time they engaged in activities
beyond funding.
3) Analytical Approach: To determine the activities of crowd
equity investors beyond the provision of funding, we adopted a
descriptive approach. This is a typical first step in exploring a
phenomenon, as evidenced by Gorman et al. [12], [29] seminal
works on the postinvestment activities of the traditional risk
investors as well as Mollick’s [19] article on the nature of
crowdfunding.
C. Study 1: Results
1) Demographic Characteristics: The crowd equity in-
vestors were predominantly male (95.21%) and had an average
age of 36.59 years. Almost two-third (63.27%) of the investors
had at least a master’s degree, and more than one-third (36.05%)
had a Ph.D. degree.
2) Postinvestment Activities: Virtually, all crowd equity in-
vestors (99.33%) played an active role in the startup in which
they invested. The types of activities that they performed beyond
financing and the percentage of investors who engaged in these
Fig. 1. Hours spent by crowd equity investors on postinvestment activities.
activities are presented in Table I. Although all crowdfunding
campaigns under investigation took the form of profit sharing
rather than preordering schemes—which is common in reward-
based crowdfunding [20]—the activity in which most crowd eq-
uity investors engaged in was buying or using the product/service
of the business-to-customer (B2C), business-to-business (B2B),
or hybrid startups. However, 90.73% of crowd equity investors
also engaged in postinvestment activities beyond funding and
purchase/usage.
Out of the 151 crowd equity investors, 128 provided us with
details on the hours they spent engaging in postinvestment
activities for the startup. The average amount of time that crowd
equity investors spent supporting a startup was 8.80 h. However,
the distribution is heavily skewed to the right; the majority of
investors (50.33%) were active for less than an hour, but about a
tenth (9.27%) invested more than 20 h. The maximum number
of hours spent was 180. Fig. 1 provides an overview.
To summarize Study 1 and answer the first research question,
we find that the crowd equity investors are widely involved in
postinvestment activities. By taking a closer look and differ-
entiating along the dimension of involvement, we gain another
interesting insight. The crowd equity investors mostly perform
what we call low-involvement activities—activities that neither
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require much effort on their side nor establishing contact with
the startup (see the Appendix for details)—such as engaging
in word of mouth or giving purchase recommendations. Only a
smaller number engage in what we call high-involvement activ-
ities, which require deliberate thought and preparation and the
establishment of personal contact between the two parties, such
as providing feedback, advice, or contacts (see the Appendix).
This conceptual distinction is deemed relevant, as activities that
require high-involvement activities may not only impart positive
aspects but also induce costs for the startup and may even
generate detrimental effects, whereas those activities that do not
require direct contact may be beneficial but remain unnoticed
by the startup [16].
The findings on the prevalence of low- and high-involvement
activities can be replicated with the data of Study 2 (see the Ap-
pendix), whose main emphasis is on exploring the antecedents
of engagement in both low- and high-involvement activities
(Research Question 2).
III. ANTECEDENTS OF POSTINVESTMENT ACTIVITIES
A. Study 2: Theoretical Considerations
We now discuss the factors that can be associated with
such engagement activities. The identified factors are related
to the specific context (investment-related factors), individual
characteristics (investor-related factors), or a combination of
both because of the relatedness of investors and investments
(proximity factors).
1) Investment-Related Factors: The determinants of the past
investment decisions of an investor will highly likely affect their
future engagement activities. The literature on risk investment
supports a connection between the amount of investment and
the corresponding rights and tasks of the investor [9]. Similarly,
there may be an association between the amount of invest-
ment and the engagement activities of a crowd equity investor.
Nonetheless, as the absolute amount of money invested in equity
crowdfunding is comparably low, this investment-related factor
may be of minor importance.
2) Investor-Related Factors: In addition to investment-
related factors, personal characteristics might be related to the
postinvestment activities of investors. In particular, we consider
crowd equity investors’ experience, demographic factors, and
motivation as important investor-related factors.
First, prior investment experience is often considered to be
positively associated with postinvestment engagement in the
literature on the traditional venture financiers [39], although
controversial findings suggest the opposite; van Osnabrugge
[40], for instance, found that serial angels are slightly less
involved in their investments than their nonserial counterparts.
Independent of the direction, the experience of a crowd equity
investor may play a role in their engagement in postinvestment
activities.
Demographic factors, particularly gender, are seldom at the
center of research endeavors, and if they are, the findings of-
ten do not reveal gender differences [41]. However, they are
almost always included as control variables in research on the
antecedents of both traditional venture finance and literature on
the engagement of customers and users for startups. Given their
potential influence on crowd equity investors’ engagement in
postinvestment activities, we will include age and gender as
possible antecedents.
It seems reasonable to suppose that an investor’s motivation
to invest can play a role in their postinvestment activities.
However, whether intrinsic or extrinsic motives are dominant
is unclear. The investments of venture capitalists are primarily
driven by extrinsic motives, such as the expectation of a high
financial return, and these motives are also strong for business
angels [45], [46]. For business angels, however, studies find that
they are not purely financially motivated, and they also have the
hedonistic and altruistic motives [47]. For example, they seek
the enjoyment of the feeling of giving something back to society
by supporting young entrepreneurs and promising technologies
[13], [45]. In the context of crowdfunding, evidence shows that
some investors are extrinsically motivated by potential high
returns [27], whereas others have a rather internalized extrinsic
motivation (e.g., for their own use) or are even intrinsically
motivated by being able to support a young venture for years
[26]. As has been studied in the context of user communities
[35], a high level of intrinsic motivation is often related to higher
engagement (e.g., contributing to the community or spreading
messages in personal networks). Therefore, we suppose that the
type of motivation (intrinsic versus extrinsic) can play a role in
the postinvestment activities of crowd equity investors.
3) Proximity Factors: In addition to investment- and
investor-related factors, the relationship between the investment
and the investor might explain crowd equity investors’ postin-
vestment engagement. In particular, we consider three types of
proximity: knowledge, geographic, and personal proximity.
Knowledge proximity, which is the extent to which an invest-
ment relates to the investor’s field of expertise, might determine
the type and scope of engagement for a portfolio company. Some
studies, such as that of Franke et al. [42], have shown that in the
preinvestment phase, the traditional venture financiers prefer to
invest in startups founded by individuals with training in the
same field. Likewise, in the postinvestment phase, research on
the traditional risk investors has demonstrated that they engage
more in industries in which they have prior experience [7]. This
enables them to provide the know-how (and other resources) that
are useful for the startup.
Regarding geographic proximity, prior literature on crowd-
funding has documented a home bias in investment decisions,
which can be explained by the informational advantages and
ease of enforcing contracts as well as by noneconomically
sensible factors resulting from calling a place home [43]. The
postinvestment activities in equity crowdfunding might also be
more likely when investors are in the same geographical area as
the ventures in which they are investing.
Personal proximity reflects the prior contact of an equity
investor with the founder(s) of the venture. In a survey of 750
venture capitalists, Hornuf and Schwienbacher [7] find that prior
contact with founders led to a higher level of interaction with
the startups in which they invested. In contrast to the traditional
venture financiers and as already outlined above, the startup
often does not maintain personal relationships with its crowd
equity investors. Thus, the role that personal proximity plays in
equity crowdfunding is less clear.
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Taken together, these three proximity-related factors may be
potential antecedents of crowd equity investors’ engagement
beyond funding.
B. Study 2: Methods
1) Empirical Setting and Data: The empirical setting of
Study 2 is widely comparable with that of Study 1 with slight
changes in our approach to collect the data based on learnings
from Study 1. We established contact with a technology startup
that was about to commence an equity crowdfunding campaign
on Conda, another leading platform in German-speaking coun-
tries, which is similar to that used in Study 1 (Seedmatch) in
terms of the amounts invested, types of campaigns, and charac-
teristics of crowd equity investors, among other characteristics.
The startup represented a typical technology venture (focused
on both B2B and B2C business) to ensure that our findings
could be generalized later on. We asked the startup to forward
a survey link to its crowd of investors 90 days after the end
of the campaign. This timespan was considered long enough for
investors to engage beyond funding but short enough to generate
more variation among investors’ postinvestment activities than
that observed in Study 1 (in which virtually every respondent
had engaged in some postinvestment activity). The questionnaire
was administered to all the startup’s 394 crowd equity investors.
In total, 278 crowd equity investors (response rate: 70.56%)
returned the questionnaire, yielding 254 sets of complete data.
To test for potential nonresponse bias, we compared the demo-
graphic data of respondents and nonrespondents using t-tests
for age, investment amount, and time of investment and χ2
tests for gender. No significant differences were found (for all
tests, p > 0.1). We also compared the responses of participants
who responded to the survey quickly (the first third of the
respondents) with those who responded late in the study (the
last third of the respondents) to check for significant differences
in their responses using t-tests and χ2 tests [44]. Again, no
significant differences were found (not significant at p > 0.1).
Overall, these results suggest the absence of a nonresponse bias.
2) Measures: Low- and high-involvement activities: To mea-
sure the engagement of crowd equity investors beyond funding,
we distinguished low-involvement activities, such as engaging
in word of mouth to promote the startup, from high-involvement
activities, such as providing contacts (see the Appendix for
details). The low-involvement activities subscale consisted of
two items, whereas the high-involvement activities subscale
consisted of three items (see the Appendix). The respondents
were asked to indicate whether they engaged in these activities.
The respondents who engaged in low-involvement activities
were assigned a value of 1, whereas those who did not engage
in low-involvement activities were assigned a value of 0. The
assignment of binary values for high-involvement activities
followed the same procedure.
Investment amount: We received pseudonymized information
on the size of each respondent’s investment directly from the
startup. The investment amount is measured in thousands of
euros.
Equity crowdfunding experience: We asked the crowd equity
investors about their prior investments in equity crowdfunding
campaigns and calculated a dummy variable on whether they
had prior experience (0 = no; 1 = yes).
Intrinsic motivation: The respondents indicated their motiva-
tion in a free entry field. We coded their statements following von
Krogh et al. framework [45]. Afterward, we formed an intrinsic
motivation index similar to Vallerand [46] and used his rec-
ommended weights of +2 (intrinsic motivation), +1 (identified
regulation), −1 (average of introjected and external regulation),
and −2 (amotivation). If no information on motivation was
provided, we assigned a score of 0. The index could, thus, span
from –3 to +3.
Age and gender: We obtained information on the age and
gender of the crowd equity investors (female = 1; male = 0)
from the startup in a pseudonymized form.
Knowledge proximity: The respondents were asked to indi-
cate on a multiple-choice scale the field(s) in which they are
currently working (e.g., art, design, entertainment, sports, or
media; agriculture, fishery, or forestry). Crowd equity investors
working in the same field as the startup (i.e., IT and mathematics)
were assigned a value of 1, whereas those who were working
outside the field were assigned a value of 0.
Geographic proximity: We also determined whether the
startup’s headquarters and the founder are based in the same
city. Basing on the ZIP code, we could trace whether the crowd
equity investor was from the same city (1) or not (0).
Personal proximity: We asked whether the investors know the
founder in person (1) or not (0).
Controls: We controlled for the number of days elapsed since
the investment was made (differed on an individual level). We
also included a dummy variable indicating whether the crowd
equity investors belonged to the founder’s family or friends (1)
or not (0) to check whether the postinvestment activities were
driven by kinship or friendship, which is a possible alternative
explanation for the motivation to provide funding and advice
irrespective of the equity crowdfunding campaign. The data were
again provided by the startup.
3) Analytical Approach: To determine the antecedents of
engagement in low- and high-involvement activities, we ran
logistic regressions, which are appropriate whenever the de-
pendent variables—as in our dataset—are binary. Our analy-
ses entail two separate regressions. In Model 1, we regress
the low-involvement activities on all independent and control
variables presented above. In Model 2, we use the engagement
in high-involvement activities as the dependent variable.
We also checked the variance inflation factors (VIFs) and
the tolerance statistics when running an ordinary least square
regression to detect potential multicollinearity issues. All VIFs
were close to 1 (maximum 1.74), and thus, well below the
suggested thresholds of 5 or 10 [47], [48]. The corresponding
tolerance statistics were all greater than 0.57, suggesting the
absence of a multicollinearity bias (potential problem < 0.20;
serious problem < 0.10) [49].
D. Study 2: Results
1) Sample Description: Similar to Study 1, the majority of
the participants are male (90.16%). Their average age is slightly
higher (about 41 years). On average, the participants invested
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TABLE II
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS AMONG THE STUDY VARIABLES
Note: N = 254; correlations with absolute values of ≤ 0.11 are significant at p < 0.1, ≤ 0.13 at p < 0.05, and ≤ 0.17 at p < 0.01.
TABLE III
ANTECEDENTS OF LOW- AND HIGH-INVOLVEMENT ACTIVITIES
Notes: p < 0.1 ∗, p < 0.05 ∗∗, and p < 0.01 ∗∗∗.
EUR 1965.75 during the equity crowdfunding campaign. The
median investment amount is EUR 500.
Concerning the engagement activities of crowd equity in-
vestors, the results for Study 2 again indicate that a large
majority—188 out of 254 (73.63%) of the participants—
engaged in activities beyond funding. However, in the compar-
ison of the engagement rate with that of Study 1, it is important
to consider the comparably short timeframe of Study 2 (90 days)
in which crowd equity investors could engage beyond funding
(see the empirical setting for the explanation). The detailed
descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables are
presented in Table II.
2) Factors Associated With Postinvestment Activities: To de-
termine the antecedents that might influence the engagement
activities of crowd equity investors, we calculated two models
(see Table III). These concern the antecedents of investors’
engagement in low-involvement activities (Model 1) and high-
involvement activities (Model 2).
The investment amount is a reliable predictor of postin-
vestment activities. It is significantly related to the low- and
high-involvement activities. The change in the odds of engaging
(rather than not engaging/staying passive) increases by 1.21 for
low-involvement activities and by 1.17 with every EUR 1000
invested.
The age of a crowd equity investor is significantly and nega-
tively associated with low-involvement activities. The odds ratio
reveals that the odds of engaging in low-involvement activities
change by 0.97 with every year of age. In other words, the odds
that a 78-year-old crowd equity investor (the oldest participant
we noted in our sample) would engage in low-involvement
activities compared with an average 18-year-old crowd equity
investor is 0.16.
Geographic proximity is significantly and positively related
to low-involvement activities. If a crowd equity investor lives
in the same city as the founder (geographic proximity = 1), the
crowd equity investor’s odds of engaging in low-involvement
activities compared with a crowd equity investor living else-
where (geographic proximity = 0) is 2.12.
Personal proximity is not associated with low-involvement
activities but is highly significantly related to high-involvement
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activities. The odds ratio reveals that if a person knows the
founder personally—the personal proximity changing from no
(0) to yes (1)—the change in the odds of engaging in high-
involvement activities is 5.23.
The intrinsic motivation of crowd equity investors is only
weakly significantly related to high-involvement activities. The
increase in the odds of engaging in high-involvement activities
is 1.32 with every unit on the motivation index.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The goal of this survey-based exploratory two-study article
was to generate an understanding of the prevalence and
antecedents of the activities in which the crowd equity investors
engaged after financial investment in a technology startup.
As equity crowdfunding had attracted increasing attention by
academics, practitioners, media, and policymakers in recent
years, we intended to enrich the ongoing discussion about
this new form of entrepreneurial finance by studying the
postinvestment activities of crowd equity investors [9]. With
our studies’ foci on the prevalence of crowd equity investors’
postinvestment activities and their antecedents, we also aimed
to provide practical insights for technology entrepreneurs into
how they might better utilize their crowd of investors.
A. Prevalence of Postinvestment Activities
Our results indicated a very high intensity in crowd equity in-
vestors’ postinvestment activities. The majority of crowd equity
investors do engage beyond providing capital and may provide
valuable contributions to the technology startup [16]. Low-
involvement activities, which we define as activities that do not
require establishing contact with the startup, such as promoting
the company or its offerings, seem to be particularly widespread
among investors. However, engagement in high-involvement
activities, in which the investor must personally establish contact
with the management team, is less common within the crowd.
The finding regarding low-involvement activities indicates that
the majority of crowd equity investors can be considered a
marketing and promotion force for the startup, which usually
has positive effects on startup success. The finding regarding
high-involvement activities, in turn, does not eliminate but rather
relativizes concerns that crowd equity investors contacting the
founders may induce detrimental effects, such as cognitive over-
load or distraction, as discussed by Di Pietro et al. [16]. After
all, our findings showed that startups do not seem to be overrun
by their crowd equity investors when it comes to innovations,
advice, or feedback.
Our results suggested that the crowd of equity investors
behaves similarly to the traditional risk investors in terms of
the scope of postinvestment activities [11], [14]. Crowd equity
investors’ engagement beyond mere financial investment seems
to be the rule rather than the exception. However, determining
the difference between the traditional investors and crowd equity
investors is important. Business angels or venture capitalists
constantly interact with the management team on a personal
level and often agree on the activities to be carried out by
investors a priori. By contrast, the engagement of crowd equity
investors is less salient; it is not a part of the investment deal
but is self-directed, and much of the engagement (i.e., low-
involvement activities) occurs under the radar of the startup.
Only high-involvement activities, which comprise about a fifth
to a quarter of postinvestment activities, are recognized by the
startup, as they require personal contact.
In addition, the engagement of the traditional investors [10]
and crowd equity investors [16] beyond funding is usually
considered to add value, which is not necessarily the case.
While low-involvement activities, such as engaging in word of
mouth and making purchase decisions, are usually considered
beneficial, the mere engagement of crowd equity investors in
high-involvement activities does not automatically mean that the
engagement will add value for the startup. For instance, only a
part of the crowd’s input might be helpful, and the need for eval-
uating and replying to feedback may add strain on the startup’s
already scarce resources. Investigating whether the crowd equity
investors’ activities are value adding is a promising direction for
extending this article. The possible research designs for such
future works could be a dyadic analysis of crowd equity investors
and startups (particularly for high-involvement activities) or
measures of crowd equity investors shaping the impression of
others (particularly for low-involvement activities).
B. Antecedents of Postinvestment Activities
In addition to determining the prevalence of postinvestment
activities of crowd equity investors, we were interested in iden-
tifying the potential antecedents of such behavior. The results of
the regression analyses revealed that among investment-related
factors, the investment amount seems to be particularly relevant
for the engagement in both low- and high-involvement activities.
As the investment amounts of crowd equity investors are rather
small compared with those of the traditional risk investors [31],
[50], this finding is remarkable. A potential explanation for the
association between the investment amount and engagement
with the startup beyond providing funding could be the risk in-
volved. Similar to the case of the traditional risk investors, crowd
equity investors’ engagement activities seem to be dependent on
the sum at stake; even if the investment amount is significantly
smaller than that in the traditional forms of venture financing
[28], [30], [31], it may still be significant for a crowd equity
investor. However, several alternative explanations exist, so we
encourage future research to investigate the mechanisms at play
in greater detail.
Among investor-related factors, most demographic factors
seem to be uncorrelated with investors’ engagement beyond
funding. Only age is negatively associated with engagement
in low-involvement activities. The finding that younger crowd
equity investors engage more in low-involvement activities
might be explained by their higher activity in social networks
[51]. Engaging in the word of mouth electronically and making
purchase recommendations online might just be easier for
younger crowd equity investors.
High-involvement activities are also associated with intrin-
sic motivation. Similar to business angels, crowd equity in-
vestors seem to enjoy supporting entrepreneurs and promising
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technologies [13], [45]. While our study highlights the impor-
tance of intrinsic motivation, our measure of motivation on an
extrinsic–intrinsic continuum might have overshadowed more
subtle associations of extrinsic motivation with postinvestment
activities. Future research could use alternative measures to
determine whether a mix of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation
or differentiating different forms of external motivation (e.g.,
along the degree of self-determination [52]) can better predict
high-involvement activities.
Regarding the association of proximity factors with engage-
ment beyond funding, interestingly, knowledge proximity is
not an antecedent of crowd equity investors’ postinvestment
activities. This contradicts most prior literature on the traditional
venture financiers’ postinvestment behavior [11]. This nonfind-
ing may be explained by the rather low knowledge requirements
for activities, such as the word of mouth and purchase recom-
mendations, which allow both people with and without prior
knowledge in the field to engage in low-involvement activities.
For high-involvement activities, crowd equity investors with a
higher knowledge distance (the inverse of knowledge proximity)
may consider their potential to contribute distant ideas, strategic
advice from cross-industry experience, or new network ties to
be equal to that of investors with greater knowledge proximity.
The finding that geographic proximity is positively associated
with low- but not high-involvement activities sheds new light on
home bias [43]. While it could be argued that the informational
advantage of locals allows them to engage in high- rather than
low-involvement activities, our results suggest the opposite. It
might be that engaging in low-involvement activities with their
network (i.e., the word of mouth and purchase recommendations
for the startup in which they invested) leads to higher reputa-
tional gains for locals than for nonlocals.
Regarding high-involvement activities, we find personal prox-
imity to be the strongest antecedent, which is thought provok-
ing because of the usually limited personal contact of star-
tups and investors in equity crowdfunding. The likelihood that
crowd equity investors with personal proximity will engage in
high-involvement activities is 5.23× higher than that of their
counterparts. This finding enriches the first insights into the
antecedents of high-involvement activities [16], as it introduces
a fresh perspective. It clearly implies that entrepreneurs will
be confronted with ideas on new products/services, strategic
advice, and opportunities for making contacts with people they
(got to) know personally without having to ask them to do so.
In informal conversations with practitioners, we learned that
quite often those crowd equity investors approach the startup that
already had a loose contact with a member of the startup (e.g.,
former business partners). Startups may need to (re)activate
these acquaintance relationships, develop new ones, and manage
them over time. Particularly when rejecting unserviceable ideas
or not following well-meant strategic advice, the way how
explanations are communicated might determine whether they
engage for the startup in the future again (or not) as research on
idea crowdsourcing suggests [53].
They also need to develop the absorptive capacity [54] to
effectively and efficiently manage the crowd’s input. As not
all of the input might be helpful, the startup needs to develop
the ability to recognize the value of the input, process it, and
apply it to commercial ends in order to profit from it [55].
A particularly useful direction for future research might be
to differentiate a start-up’s potential absorptive capacity from
its realized absorptive capacity to understand the contingencies
when crowd equity investors’ input is perceived as value adding
versus truly adding value.
C. Theoretical and Managerial Implications
Equity crowdfunding has emerged as an alternative to the
traditional forms of financing technological innovation [1], but
whether other benefits that the traditional investors bring beyond
funding [10], [11] exist in crowdfunding has been questionable.
Recent research has provided initial qualitative insights that
crowd equity investors might also engage in postinvestment
activities [16]. Our investigation on the prevalence of postin-
vestment activities of crowd equity investors extends these ini-
tials insights and demonstrates that engaging with the startup
beyond funding is the rule rather than the exception in equity
crowdfunding. Beyond contributing these descriptive insights,
our exploration of the antecedents of low- and high-involvement
postinvestment activities also adds to the emerging stream on
the engagement of crowd equity investors beyond funding and
contributes to the debate on whether equity crowdfunding can
complement or even replace the traditional forms of venture
financing [9].
Beyond its theoretical contributions, this article provides prac-
tical implications for technology startups that are considering
whether to use this form of venture funding or that have al-
ready generated financial investment from a crowd. Knowledge
about the postinvestment activities that can be expected by
different types of risk investors is useful for better targeting
them during the campaign. Having a more precise picture of
equity crowdfunding enables technology startups to influence
the self-selection decision of the crowd equity investors and in-
crease the odds that they invest in the campaign—first pecuniary
and later nonpecuniary as well. The results from our second
study, for instance, suggest that the crowd equity investors
who provide higher individual investments are more likely to
engage in high- and low-involvement activities, which might
be achieved by increasing the minimum investment amount or
offering specific benefits for large investors (e.g., fireside talks
with the founders). The findings also give the first indications of
how entrepreneurs might stimulate higher engagement in either
high- or low-involvement activities.
For instance, as crowd equity investors who know the
founders personally engage more in high-involvement activities,
founders might try to establish personal contact with crowd
equity investors when they wish to receive feedback or advice
or want them to establish new contacts. Particularly the
(re)activation of loose contacts seems to hold significant benefit
according to our informal conversations with practitioners.
Startups may need to develop new ways of reactivating those
loose contacts and building new relationships with their crowd
members virtually (e.g., the equity crowdfunding platform) and
physically (e.g., events) [56].
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Another promising route might be to appeal to crowd equity
investors’ intrinsic motivation, which was also found to be as-
sociated with greater engagement in high-involvement activities
(e.g., by providing a meaningful rationale to engage or offering
insufficient external rewards [57]). As a caveat, of course, the
need to evaluate and provide feedback on the input from the
crowd (even if unsolicited) uses up scarce resources. Building
the ability to efficiently and effectively differentiate valuable
from unserviceable input is, therefore, a key. As a starting point
for building such an absorptive capacity, judging who provides
the knowledge might be the first step. Research on other crowd
phenomena suggests that, for instance, crowd members’ input is
most valuable when it comes from areas they are familiar with
the article presented in [58].
Regarding low-involvement activities, geographic and age
targeting (e.g., via social media marketing campaigns) might
help to attract crowd equity investors from the same area, which
tend to engage more in low-involvement activities. Our findings
may also suggest that the technology startups should find ways
that make it easy for their crowd equity investors to engage in
such activities (i.e., low involvement). For instance, as particu-
larly younger crowd equity investors engage in low-involvement
activities, such as (electronic) the word of mouth, the start-up’s
social media campaigns may allow them to easily forward infor-
mation about the start-up’s products and pass along marketing
messages by simply liking or retweeting a post.
D. Limitations and Future Research
Our studies are subject to certain limitations that need to be
considered when generalizing the results. First, the findings may
be limited to European countries and may not be fully applicable
to other major regions, such as the U.S. and China. The different
regulations for equity crowdfunding in these two countries or the
higher average funding per campaign in Europe [59] may lead to
fundamental differences in the crowd’s composition and, thus, to
differences in the quality and quantity of crowd equity investors’
engagement activities beyond funding. Likewise, the choice of
our empirical context for Study 2 may limit the generalizability
of our results. While the campaign is a typical example of a tech-
nology startup—in terms of the industry, the stage of the startup,
and the way it is promoted on platforms [19]—the boundaries
of our findings remain unknown; for instance, the focal startup
followed a hybrid business model (B2B and B2C). As a crowd
equity investor might be more likely to make a purchase recom-
mendation for a B2C product than a B2B product, our results
might be more accentuated in the former. We encourage future
research to investigate crowd equity investors’ engagement in
postinvestment activities in other empirical contexts (e.g., dif-
ferent regions, types of startups, and forms of campaigns).
Second, our studies are cross sectional and, thus, limited
by the absence of information about changes in crowd equity
investors’ engagement activities over time. To fully understand
the postinvestment dynamics at play in equity crowdfunding,
scholars need to study the changes in engagement for startups
throughout the investment, as it seems likely that the types
and intensity of postinvestment activities might vary according
to the development of the investors’ overall portfolio and the
development of the company.
Finally and beyond the scope of this article, research needs
to focus on the consequences of crowd equity investors’ postin-
vestment activities (e.g., effects on startup success). We hope
that our present work spurs further research on this topic.
APPENDIX
I. MEASURING POSTINVESTMENT ACTIVITIES
To measure the postinvestment activities of crowd equity
investors, we built on the postinvestment activities performed
most often in Study 1 and inductively found that they can be
conceptually distinguished along with the level of task involve-
ment [60]. While some activities require little effort and are easy
to perform in everyday situations, such as engaging in word of
mouth to promote the startup in one’s personal network, others
require considerably more effort, as they necessitate crowd eq-
uity investors to reflect, prepare, and get in personal contact with
the startup (i.e., provide ideas, advice, and contacts). Drawing
on the notions of the task involvement literature, we call the for-
mer low-involvement activities and the latter high-involvement
activities.
For Study 2, which aims at explaining the antecedents of
postinvestment activities, we built on the five items for the most
common activities from Study 1 beyond simply buying/using the
product. To be specific, rare activities (i.e., conducted by 1 or 2
crowd equity investors) discovered in Study 1 (e.g., innovating
the product, working as an employee) were not included in
the survey of Study 2. For Study 2, we also integrated three
similar items of Study 1 (evaluate product, test product, and
give feedback) into one (provide feedback).
We conducted an exploratory factor analysis (principal-axis
factoring) with the five items with orthogonal rotation (varimax)
to explore whether the two factors we conceptually developed
would also emerge from reducing the dataset. The Kaiser–
Meyer–Olkin measure of 0.71 indicated good adequacy for the
analysis [49], and Bartlett’s test of sphericity, χ² (10) = 223.35,
p < 0.01, verified that the correlations were sufficiently large.
Two factors had eigenvalues above 1 (Kaiser’s criterion) and
explained 66.04% of the variance in total. Table IV presents
the rotated factor loadings, eigenvalues, and the percentage of
variance explained.
The high-involvement activities subscale had a rather high
reliability (Cronbach’s α = 0.68). As the low-involvement ac-
tivities subscale consisted of only two items, we calculated the
Spearman–Brown statistic [61]; the subscale was found to have
adequate reliability (Spearman–Brown’s ρ = 0.55).
Overall, the results from the exploratory factor analysis sug-
gest that the crowd equity investors’ activities indeed have two
underlying factors: low- and high-involvement activities.
II. REASSESSING THE PREVALENCE OF POSTINVESTMENT
ACTIVITIES
The results from replicating research question 1 with the
independent sample of Study 2 reveal that the prevalence of
postinvestment activities in Study 2 is similar to Study 1 (see
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TABLE IV
EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS RESULTS
Note: n = 273; rotated factor loadings over 0.40 appear in bold.
TABLE V
CROWD EQUITY INVESTORS’ ENGAGEMENT IN POSTINVESTMENT ACTIVITIES (STUDY 2)
Note: n = 269–275; items translated from German.
Table V). The number of crowd equity investors engaging in
low-involvement activities is high (74.46%), while the number
engaging in high-involvement activities is considerably smaller
(20.14%).
When comparing the percentages of Study 1 and Study 2, it
is important to keep in mind that our goal was to replicate the
same research question with a new data collection that used a
slightly different research design (i.e., reduced item pool and a
shorter period of 90 days).
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